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Abstract: This article rejects the linkages in proposals that the Federal 
Reserve Bank (Fed) target equity prices.  The real federal funds rate (RFF) and 
stock prices (SP) are uncorrelated; causality tests show a positive effect of SP on 
RFF and a negative effect of SP on RFF.  These results occur as part of the 
dynamics of a negative cointegrated relationship  between SP and RFF.  A 
theoretically expected inverse relation between SP and inflation accounts for the 
results.  The negative effect of SP on FF is also confirmed in a Taylor Rule 
estimate.  Higher stock prices anticipate lower, not higher, inflation.   
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 U.S. Monetary Policy and Stock Prices:  
Should the Fed Attempt to Control Stock Prices? 
 
The boom-bust in stock prices since the mid-1990s and growing ownership of equities by 
households, both in numbers and in portfolio share, focused policy-makers’ and analysts’ 
attention on the so-called “wealth effect” of stock prices on spending.  It also led to calls 
for the Federal Reserve (Fed) to take stock prices into account in the conduct of monetary 
policy, in the extreme case, to target stock prices to stabilize the economy.  One major 
study, Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000), concluded: 
A central bank concerned with hitting an inflation target at a given time horizon, and 
achieving as smooth a path as possible for inflation, is likely to achieve superior 
performance by adjusting its policy instrument not only to inflation or its inflation 
forecast and the output gap, but to asset prices as well. 
 
Chairman Greenspan’s 1996 speech expressing concern for irrational exuberance began a 
preoccupation with stock price developments as stock prices rose and then later when 
they fell.  Outside observers readily concluded that the Fed was concerned with 
stabilizing the course of stock prices.1  
 
Not surprisingly, when stock prices began a long period of decline in spring 2000, attacks 
on the Fed escalated, with critics blaming the Fed for a deliberate or unwitting effort to 
deflate asset prices.2  When the Fed did begin to ease in early 2001, these critics urged 
                                                          
1 See Miller, Weller and Zhang (1999), for example. The moral hazard that such a belief fostered was 
reinforced by the Fed’s easing actions in fall 1998, due to their concern over the emerging market financial 
crisis—especially its manifestation in Russia’s partial sovereign default.  There was also a perception in 
the market that the risks to the U.S. financial system arising from the near failure of Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) and other hedge funds had contributed to the Fed’s willingness to ease.  
 
2 Glassman and Hassett (2001) complete the circle, in effect faulting the Fed for a fixation on stock prices 
in missing the downturn.  They suggest that the Fed should have interpreted the fall in stock prices in 
spring 2000 as a sign of slowing and should have eased earlier.  So it is not the fixation that was a problem, 
in their view, but the Fed’s interpretation of the market signal.   
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 more rapid and extensive easing to calm the equity markets.  In April and May 2001, the 
Fed muddied the water further, justifying two 50 basis point cuts in the federal funds rate, 
in part, by the decline in equity prices and risk this posed for consumer spending. 
 
This article examines whether there is an exploitable link between the Fed’s main policy 
instrument, the federal funds rate, and stock prices, as captured by the price-earnings (PE) 
ratio.  Second, it looks at whether such a link supports the hypotheses of advocates for a 
Fed response to stock price changes.  The PE ratio (and its inverse, the earnings yield) is 
used here to assess empirical relationships and the study uses annual data to investigate 
low frequency long-run relationships.  It begins with a brief discussion of the theoretical 
issues related to stock prices and Fed objectives.  Section II highlights the important 
theoretical channel tying inflation to adverse stock price developments, a channel often 
ignored in theoretical discussions. 
 
Section III addresses the simple observation that there is an inverse relationship between 
the PE ratio and the fed funds rate.  This relationship is at the heart of expectations that 
the Fed could vary the fed funds rate to inversely affect stock prices.  The argument here 
is that this correlation does not provide evidence for assessing whether the Fed can 
influence stock prices or is influenced by them.  The inverse relationship occurs only 
because both stock prices and the fed funds rate are related to a third factor—inflation, 
not because they are related to each other.  The fed funds rate is a nominal interest rate 
and it is the real fed funds rate that should be related to the equity yield and its inverse, 
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 the PE ratio.3  There is no correlation between the real fed funds rate and the PE ratio, 
however.  
 
Since a lack of correlation could arise from the simultaneous determination of stock 
prices and the real fed funds rate, causality tests and time series analysis are used to 
assess whether there is evidence of an exploitable relationship. The causality results are 
presented in section IV.  Bi-directional causality from the earnings yield to the real 
federal funds rate is indicated. However, the signs of the relationships are opposite to 
those that are expected by some Fed critics who expect that an increase in the fed funds 
rate will lower stock prices and advocate that a rise (fall) in stock prices should raise 
(lower) the fed funds rate.  In addition, causality evidence does not support the Fed’s 
ability to influence the real fed funds rate.  
 
Time series evidence shows that both the correlation and causality results are part of the 
broad dynamic relationship between the real fed funds rate and stock prices.  More 
importantly, it establishes that there is a long-run positive relationship of real yields,  
                                                          
3Enough readers of earlier versions of this article have been troubled by the claim that the PE ratio is a real 
variable to warrant immediate attention to the issue.  First, the PE ratio is the ratio of two nominal 
measures, hence it is a relative return, not a nominal rate.  For example, deflating both price and earnings 
by the price level to obtain real measures leaves the ratio unchanged.  More important, consider a simple 
dividend discount model of asset valuation where, for simplicity, it is assumed that the pay-out ratio is one, 
and real earnings are expected to remain constant.  The value of an equity claim (P) given nominal earnings 
is E/(i - π), where i is the required nominal return on equity and π is the expected rate of inflation and 
earnings growth.  Thus the PE ratio is the inverse of the real rate r = (i– π) used to discount future earnings.  
The presence of dividends, an equity premium or growth of earnings does not alter the generality of these 
results.  Inflation affects the PE ratio, then, only if real earnings, real growth, or the required real rate of 
interest used to discount earnings are affected by inflation.   
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 including the real fed funds rate and equity yield, which implies the expected inverse 
market relationship between the real fed funds rate and stock prices.  However, the short-
run dynamics show that an increase in the real fed funds rate has no initial effect on stock 
prices, hence the absence of a contemporaneous correlation.  An increase in the real fed 
funds rate, after a lag, will raise stock prices.  Third, a positive shock to stock prices leads 
to a fall in the real fed funds rate according to the causality tests and this is reinforced by 
the error correction process and the long-run equilibrium relationship found in the time 
series analysis.  Most importantly, the time series evidence indicates a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between stock prices and inflation.  This relationship clarifies the 
role in inflation in the explanation for why a rise in the fed funds rate raises stock prices 
and conversely why a rise in stock prices leads to a fall in the fed funds rate.  It also 
clarifies how the Fed can influence the real fed funds rate in the short run, but has no 
effect on the real fed funds rate or the ability of the Fed to influence stock prices in the 
long run.   
 
Section V examines whether there is evidence that the Fed has reacted to increase in 
stock prices by raising the fed funds rate, as proponents of a reaction now advocate.  
Controlling for inflation and gross domestic product (GDP) gap in an estimate of the 
Taylor Rule, there is a significant negative relationship between stock prices and the 
nominal fed funds rate.  When stock prices increase and there is a related decline in 
current and future inflation, the Fed systematically lowers the fed funds rate, and 
conversely for stock price declines.  Since stock price moves are negatively related to 
inflation, dynamic relationships are opposite to conventional expectations.  While the Fed 
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 has not, and apparently should not target stock prices, past performance in setting the fed 
funds rate at least reflected the correct relation: higher stock prices are an indicator of 
lower future inflation and support a lower fed funds rate.   
 
Section VI provides a summary of the results and the implications.  The conclusions can 
be briefly, if perhaps over-simplistically, anticipated.  Policy actions that raise the fed 
funds rate to lower future inflation will, if successful, also raise stock prices.  To react to 
the stock price rise by further tightening would destabilize the achievement of inflation 
and/or output goals.  Second, other factors such as changes in tax policy or technology 
that could boost the rate of return to capital and thereby raise stock prices also lower 
future prices, other things equal.  To tighten monetary policy in the face of favorable 
inflation developments would destabilize efforts to foster growth and maintain price 
stability.  It is well known that adding new targets for policy-makers without increasing 
the number of instruments creates new trade-offs and compromises the effectiveness of 
policy.4  In this case, the problem would be worse because advocates of a stock price 
response propose targeting increasing stock prices as a source of higher future inflation, 
when in fact higher stock prices are typically an indicator of forces that are slowing 
inflation. 
  
I.  The Theoretical Issues 
The central theoretical issue in this article is the relationship of stock prices to inflation.  
Proponents of a Fed reaction have in mind models in which a rise in stock prices boost 
wealth and thereby create a wealth effect raising consumption.  The presence of this 
                                                          
4 Bullard and Schaling (2002) provide a useful review of this problem and provide some evidence based on 
a theoretical investigation of adding a stock price objective to a Taylor Rule.  
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 wealth effect and of its strength are the subjects of a growing literature that goes beyond 
this paper.  A second literature concerns the effect of inflation on stock prices.  With 
neutrality of money, the conclusion of that literature is that inflation does not affect stock 
prices.  Yet, as Bakshi and Chen (1996) note, a negative correlation between stock prices 
and inflation is one of the most commonly accepted empirical facts in financial 
economics.5  There is a theoretical literature that explains this correlation as arising from 
the non-neutrality of the tax system, though Bakshi and Chen ignore such arguments.6  
Higher inflation boosts effective tax rates, lowering real after-tax returns on investment 
and thereby lowering stock prices.  Similarly, lower stock prices affect the real cost of 
capital, investment, output and prices.  These two channels are expected to dictate the 
relationship between monetary policy and stock prices and between stock prices and the 
objectives of the Fed.  Whether there is a wealth effect is not the issue, so long as it is 
relatively weak, and that is the alternative hypothesis here.  The federal funds rate, like 
other nominal rates, includes an inflation premium.  If stock prices are inversely related 
to inflation, then there will be an inverse relationship between stock prices or the PE ratio 
and nominal fed funds rate, even if there were no relationship between the real fed funds 
rate and stock prices.   
                                                          
5 Sharpe (2002) provides recent evidence using quarterly data from 1983 through I/2001 and Tatom (2002) 
also finds such a significant negative relationship using monthly data from July, 1954 through January, 
2001.    
6 In their extensive review of the literature, the negative correlation of stock prices and inflation arises from 
pro-cyclical real interest rates, and hence counter-cyclical stock prices, along with pro-cyclical inflation.  
None of the models they review are based on non-neutralities arising through the tax system.   
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 The theoretical basis of the inverse relation of stock prices and inflation is the non-
neutrality of the tax system for income from capital.  For example, the taxation of 
corporate income based on income measures that use historical cost depreciation is one 
possible reason for an adverse effect of inflation on equity prices.  Inflation raises the 
future replacement cost of capital, but not future cost for tax purposes.  As a result, future 
earnings are overstated and this will boost taxes.  Equity prices discount higher future 
taxes resulting in lower equity prices relative to current earnings.7  Thus, higher future 
prices will raise measured earnings and lower economic earnings via the tax effect.  Both 
factors will lower the price-earnings ratio.  In an earnings-discount model, a rise in 
inflation will raise the observed equity premium (due to the income measurement error 
and to a rise in the true equity premium).  Second, as Barro (1996) and others have 
explained, higher inflation lowers true earnings growth because it raises the cost of 
capital, which lowers the optimal capital-labor ratio, slowing capital formation and 
income growth.  These two effects will lower the PE ratio. 
 
Hess and Lee (1999) argue that the relationship between stock prices and inflation 
depends on the source of inflation.  In their view, aggregate demand shocks can boost 
inflation and stock prices but are neutral in their long-run effects on output and stock 
prices.  In contrast, adverse supply shocks, which slow output and raise prices, in 
contrast, lower the return to capital and thereby lower stock prices, inducing a negative  
                                                          
7 See Feldstein (1980) or Tatom and Turley (1976), for example.  Fama (1981) suggests that the negative 
correlation between inflation and stock prices arises from supply shocks, while Modigliani and Cohn argue 
that inflation should raise stock prices.  Other studies indicate that inflation reduces real economic growth.  
See Barro, (1996) for example.  If capital income before taxes is a constant share of GDP, then corporate 
earnings growth is reduced by inflation as well.   
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 correlation between stock prices and inflation.  Their model, following Bakshi and Chen, 
does not allow for non-neutrality of monetary growth or tax distortions that are a function 
of the price level or inflation.  They find that demand-induced inflation raises stock 
prices, but they fail to point out that this effect is more than offset within two quarters.  
Thus both demand and supply shocks give rise to a reduction in stock prices in their 
work, though they focus on an initial effect, which appears to differ for the two sources.  
This distinction is not pursued here because there is no theoretical or empirical basis for a 
concern for this difference in the current context.8    
 
II.  Stock Prices and the Federal Funds Rate: The Inflation Connection 
A basic problem for assessing the link between the federal funds rate and stock prices is 
their simultaneous determination.  Consider the arguments of proponents of taking stock 
prices into account in setting policy.  In their view, markets react to a federal funds rate 
hike by reducing stock prices, so there is a negative expected correlation between the 
federal funds rate and stock prices (called a market response, or reaction, below).  On the 
other hand, they propose that the Fed raise rates when stock prices rise excessively, 
imparting a positive correlation between the two measures (called a Fed response or 
reaction below).  Thus, either correlation could be observable.  If one assumes the Fed 
does not currently react to stock prices and that markets do react to changes in the fed  
                                                          
8 Tatom (2002) explicitly tests whether a long run equilibrium, or cointegrating, relationship found in 
monthly data for inflation and the earnings yield, the same as below, differs depending on the source of 
inflation and rejects the hypothesis that it is different.  Specifically, inflation that is not systematically 
related to energy price shocks has the same negative effect on stock prices as does energy-price-shock-
based inflation.  
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 funds rate, then the correlation between the two measures is expected to be negative.9 
 
Another important question is how to measure the stock price to which the Fed may react 
or that is influenced by Fed activity.  The choice here is to use the PE ratio for the S&P 
500, a broad index typically used to capture movements in aggregate stock prices.10  The 
PE ratio is based on an average of quarterly data, which are the end- 
of-quarter stock price relative to the past four quarters’ earnings.  Thus, earnings are 
largely predetermined and movements in the yield reflect the change in stock prices.  
This is the main reason researchers use it as a measure of stock prices.  The earnings 
yield, the inverse of the PE-ratio, also is more readily comparable to other yields.  It is 
movements in stock prices relative to earnings that are of interest in assessing price 
movements that are of concern to investors or to policy-makers.  There is also a strong 
negative correlation between annual changes in the S&P stock price index (logarithm of 
average of daily figures) and annual changes in the earnings yield (-0.74).  The discussion 
below concentrates on the use of the earnings yield, though differences in key results 
using stock prices are indicated. Figure 1 shows the nominal federal funds rate and the 
                                                          
9 Rigoban and Sack (2001) focus on this problem and provide a useful way of dealing with it based on the 
heteroskedasticity of shocks to stock prices and the three-month Treasury bill rate.  They find a positive 
correlation between stock prices and the three-month Treasury bill rate and interpret this as due to a Fed 
reaction.  One study of the effect of monetary policy on stock returns, Booth and Booth (1997), shows that 
returns on stocks are inversely related to monetary policy variables, especially the fed funds rate, even 
controlling for business condition proxies.  Their results hold for both expansions and contractions, 
contrary to the finding of Jensen et al. (1996), who find such an effect for contractions only when using the 
discount rate as the policy variable.  Earlier studies argued that monetary policy affected stock returns by 
affecting business condition variables, such as dividend spreads, default spreads and term spreads.  See 
Fama and French (1989) for the classic statement of this argument.  
10 Shen (2000) uses the S&P PE ratio as a measure of stock prices and its inverse as the earnings yield.  
Shen follows Campbell and Shiller (1998), in this regard, and is primarily interested in the predictive 
content of the PE ratio for future stock prices.  Interestingly, Shen, following his own work and others, 
advocates the use of the earnings yield less a nominal interest rate measure as a predictor of future stock 
prices.  The arguments below apply to this mix of a real yield and nominal interest rate, in particular, the 
sensitivity of both to inflation. 
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 earnings yield.  The real federal funds rate (based on the consumer price index) is also 
shown.11  The nominal federal funds rate appears to be positively related to the earnings 
yield, so that a higher federal funds rate is associated with lower stock prices.  The simple 
correlation coefficient for the two measures (Table 1) is positive and statistically 
significant at a conventional 5 percent level.  The first-differences in the federal funds 
rate and in the earnings yield are also significantly correlated (Table 2).  
 
There is a clear pattern to the fed funds rate and earnings yield in Figure 1: both measures 
generally rose until the early 1980s and then generally fell.  
Figure 1 
The Earnings Yield Is Correlated With the Federal Funds Rate 
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11 The data used are from the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers (2001) and their monthly publication, 
Selected Economic Indicators.  The federal funds rate is the annual average of monthly averages of daily 
figures.  The CPI is also the average of monthly data, so the real fed funds rate is the annual average fed 
funds rate less annual inflation.  The ex post real rate assumed to be a reliable indicator of the ex ante rate.  
A test of  whether actual inflation is a suitable measure for anticipated inflation was conducted using the 
biannual Livingston Survey forecasts of inflation and comparable year ahead measures of actual inflation 
from 1959 through 2000.  An F-test of the joint hypothesis for whether the Livingston forecast is unbiased 
and has a unit coefficient in forecasting actual inflation is 0.32, which is not significant; the five-percent 
critical value (2,83) is 3.11.  The individual t-statistics for the components of this hypothesis are each less 
than one.   
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 This corresponds to the pattern of inflation, rising from 1959 to the early 1980s, then 
falling. The individual cases where the two series rose the most, contributing to the 
appearance of a positive relationship, are periods when inflation rose sharply, especially 
1974 and 1980-81.  Significant correlation coefficients indicate that inflation has a 
positive relationship with the nominal fed funds rate and a negative relationship with 
stock prices. 
Table 1 
Correlation Coefficients (Levels) 
(1959-2000) 
Federal funds Earnings-
(S&P 500) 
Real federal Inflation rate  
rate price ratio funds rate (CPI) 
Federal funds 1.0  0.78  0.35  0.78 
rate 
Earnings-
(S&P 500) 
  1.0 -0.07  0.84 
price ratio 
Real federal    1.0 -0.30 
funds rate 
Inflation rate     1.0 
(CPI) 
Critical value (5 percent): 0.31; insignificant correlation in bold. 
irst-differences (Table 2) show the same significant 
lationships.   T  t hip be und E 
ratio arises from a common third fa .  The role of inflation in producing the 
ation between the federal funds rate and the earnings yield is reinforced by the fact 
elation between the real federal funds rate and stock prices is near zero, not 
ositive (-0.07).  
                                                          
The correlation coefficients for the f
12re his suggests that he relations
ctor, inflation
tween the fed f s rate and the P
correl
that the corr
significantly p
12 Like the earnings yield, there is no significant correlation between stock price changes with changes in 
the nominal or real federal funds rate, the manufacturing capacity utilization rate or the GDP gap.  
 12 
 
 Table 2 
(1960-2000) 
rate ratio (S&P funds rate (CPI) 
Correlation coefficients for first-differences 
 Federal funds Earnings-price 
500) 
Real federal Inflation rate 
Federal funds  1.0  0.63  0.48  0.67 
rate 
Earnings-price 
500) 
  1.0  0.05  0.64 
ratio (S&P 
Real federal 
funds rate 
   1.0 -0.33 
Inflation rate 
(CPI) 
    1.0 
Critical value (5 percent): 0.31; insignificant correlation in bold 
 
The correlation between changes in the real federal funds rate and the earnings yield is 
also essentially zero (0.05).  It appears that the Fed has had no influence on asset prices 
for the past 40 years, at least on a contemporaneous, or within the year, basis. 
 
The positive relationship for the fed funds rate and the earnings yield in Figure 1 
apparently arises from the fact that during periods when inflation was higher, nominal 
interest rates were higher and stock prices were lower.  Controlling for inflation, changes  
in the federal funds rate have had no effect on stock prices. 
 
There are two other points about the inflation correlation coefficients worth noting.  First, 
the real federal funds rate is only marginally related to inflation at best, according to these 
simple statistics.  A negative correlation might be expected to result from the construction 
of the real rate or from a policy-related rise (fall) in the real federal funds rate that 
induces a simultaneous reduction (rise) in inflation.  But the real federal funds rate, like 
s many other real interest rate measures, may simply be unrelated to nominal development
 13 
 
 such as inflation, a strong form of the Fisher effect in which money growth and inflation 
econd, there is a strong and significant positive relation of the earnings 
yield and inflation.  The earnings yield is a key component of the cost of capital.  It is 
negative lation with i ent and output resulting in a positive 
ices or in ation.  The correlation coefficien he levels of 
gs yield and inflation and for first-differences in each are 0.84 and 0.64, 
.   
he appropriate comparison for assessing the influence of monetary policy on equity 
prices, especially the earnings yield, is to look at the real federal funds rate, since the 
earnings yield on equities is a real yield.  Tables 1 and 2 also provide the correlation of 
the real federal funds rate and the earnings yield. The correlation coefficients suggest that  
the Fed would not be capable of influencing equity prices by altering the real federal 
funds rate, should they want to, though this evidence may be weak to the extent that the 
Fed has not tried to influence stock prices.  
are neutral.  S
likely to have a  corre nvestm
relationship to pr
earnin
fl ts for t the 
respectively 13
 
T
14
                                                          
13 There have been few studies of the effects of asset prices on inflation.  Stock and Watson (2001) review 
stable across time periods and countries.  The time series results below are not sensitive to time period, 
however, at least within the range of the data available here.  Stock and Watson’s review includes tests for 
the nominal and real stock price and the dividend yield.  They do not examine any long-term interest rate 
effect.  Instead they examine potential effects of short-term rates or spreads on inflation. 
the earnings yield, one and two period leads and lags of each measure were added to the correlation
period-ahead earnings yield.  This suggests that a higher real federal funds rate in the current period will 
raise stock prices two years later, not the result expected by proponents using monetary policy to stabilize 
the stock market.  All other lead/lags had insignificant correlation coefficients.  The same pattern is 
revealed in the causality tests below, but controlling for inflation, it becomes insignificant, suggesting that 
the literature and provide their own evidence indicating that the effects of asset prices on inflation are not 
14 To check for significant positive leading or lagging relationships between the real federal funds rate and 
 matrix.  
The results reveal a significant negative correlation between the lagged real federal funds rate and the one-
that higher fed funds rate lead to lower fed funds rates only because they lower inflation.    
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 III.  Causality Tests  
To test for causality, Granger causality tests for all four variables in Tables 1 and 2 we
conducted for lags up to five years.
re 
ot 
gs 
ausality 
ch pair using three lags.  The last three columns in the table report the 
sults of more detailed examination of the significant lagged independent variables and 
ive 
ed is shown in the last column (from zero to 
the number indicated). 
 
Table 3 shows that there is bi-directional causality between the earnings yield and both 
15  With only one lag, the absence of causality cann
be rejected for any pair of variables.  Adding two or three lags resulted in increasing 
numbers of rejections of the absence of causality, but the results with four or five la
were the same as with three lags.  The first three columns of Table 3 show the c
test results for ea
re
the sign of their effects.  For the Granger-causality column, only significant lagged 
dependent variables are included and these are found from searches of the auto-regress
properties of each dependent variable.  The number of lags is indicated in the first entry 
for each equation in the last column.  The Granger causality equations are also estimated 
including current and past inflation terms to control for the influence of inflation in 
accounting for the causality.  These results are reported in the penultimate column and 
the number of significant inflation lags includ
the federal funds rate and the real federal funds rate.  Each of the latter two variables 
causes inflation, according to the evidence.  Before examining the causal relationships in 
more detail, it is important to note the evidence on the absence of causality.  First, the 
evidence shows that the Fed cannot control the real federal funds rate, the primary 
                                                          
15 For asset prices, it is only innovations in policy or economic performance that should matter, and t
only contemporaneously.  The vector-error-correction evidence below may be more pertinent for assessing 
the effects of shocks in one measure on the other.   
hen 
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 channel for the influence of monetary policy, at least in a fed funds rate-targeting 
 
 
-
 
 
r that 
.  In 
 
nds rate, but it is consistent with increases in the fed funds rate 
ducing inflation with a two-year lag.17 
                                                          
framework.  The causality tests cannot reject the absence of causality either from the fed 
funds rate to the real fed funds rate or vice versa.16 Second, the evidence cannot reject the
absence of causality from inflation to the earnings yield or the reverse; movements in
stock prices do not cause inflation and stock prices do not affect inflation, in a Granger
causal sense at least.  There is a relationship between inflation and stock prices indicated
in the table, however, and this relationship is discussed below.  Third, the absence of 
causality from the nominal or real federal funds rate to inflation cannot be rejected, but as
noted, the evidence supports the reverse direction of causality.  Thus it would appea
inflation does not cause a reaction by the Fed, but movements in the nominal (and real) 
fed funds rate cause inflation.   
 
A closer look at the causality tests can reduce the incredulity these results may create
particular, the only significant lag on the fed funds rate is the second lag and the sign of
its effect on inflation is negative.  The evidence suggests that inflation does not cause the 
Fed to change the fed fu
re
fed 
funds rate.  The absence of causality from inflation to the nominal fed funds rate does not hold up when the 
e 
together, these results suggest that most of the variation in the federal funds rate reflects a reaction to 
16 In tests that add current and lagged inflation terms to a Granger test equation, reported in the last two 
columns of Table 3, a rise in the fed funds rate is shown to cause a rise in the real fed funds rate, but the 
reverse is not the case.   
17Tests that add current inflation to the test equations further clarify the relationship of inflation and the 
current period inflation rate is included in the estimate.  In the reverse case, however, there is no positiv
effect of inflation on the real fed funds rate even when the current inflation rate is included.  Taken 
inflation aimed at maintaining the real fed funds rate, not changing it or allowing it to be changed by 
inflation.   
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 Table 3 
Causality Tests  
does not cause variable B (3, 32) for 
critical 
(5% = 2.90) 
(t-statistic) 
Hypothesis: Variable A F-statistic 
hypothesis 
value 
Significant lag(s)/sum effect 
Variable A Variable B * = reject at Granger Including Lag 
 
(variable B, 
ion) 
5% level causality inflation structure
inflat
Federal funds Earnings yield 8.37* 2(-),3(+)/ 
(-2.41) 
2(-),3(+)/ 
(-1.67) 
(1,2) 
rate -0.192 -0.145 
Earnings yield Federal funds 
rate 
5.13* 2(+) 
0.546 
(3.39) 
2(+) 
0.378 
(3.16) 
(1,1) 
Real fed funds Earnings yield 3.24* 2(-) NA (1,0) 
rate -0.314 
(-3.03) 
-0.164 
(-1.67) 
Earnings yield Real fed funds 
rate 
3.71* 1(-),2(+) 
0.138 
(1.74) 
2(+) 
0.328 
(3.48) 
(1,1) 
Inflation 
 
Earnings yield 2.08 NA 0(+),1(-),2(+) 
0.353 
(1.2) 
 ((3.15) 
Earnings yield 
 
Inflation 0.28 NA SAME (3) 
 
Real fed funds 
rate 
 
Federal funds 
rate 
1.70 NA NA (1.2) 
Federal funds 
 
Real fed funds 1.34 NA 1(+) 
0.713 
(6.37) 
(0.1) 
rate rate 
Inflation 
 
 
Federal funds 
rate 
1.70 NA 0(+),1(-) 
0.291 
(2.58) 
(1,1) 
Federal funds Inflation 3.53* 2(-) SAME (3,NA) 
rate 
 
-0.322 
(-2.90) 
Inflation Real fed funds 1.34 NA 0(+).1(-) (1,NA)
 
 
rate 0.005 
(0.06) 
 
Real fed funds 
rate 
Inflation 3.53* 2(-) 
-0.322 
(-2.90) 
SAME (3,NA) 
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 Such an effect of the fed funds rate (nominal or real) is also observed for stock prices.  A 
s rate will raise stock prices and do so two years later, just as the effect 
reducing inflation is realized.  T e at the fed funds rate causes 
the earnings yield indicates that  statistically significant causal effect two years 
later lowering the earnings yield ock prices.  For the nominal fed funds rate, 
some of this effect is reversed thr er erall  higher
rate raising stock prices remains after three years.   
 
The last column in Table 3 clarifies the importance lation in accounting for th
r ur value flation ar d to the te ations, th
effect of the fed funds rate on the earnings yield is not significant.  The real fed funds rate 
two years earlier now has no statistically significan t on the stock prices, once 
inflation is taken into account.  Similarly the overall effect of a rise in the nominal fed 
funds rate in raising stock prices two s later, the ering the e third yea
becom i ea lation is taken into ac nt.18   
 
Thus, while there is no evidence that stock prices and inflation are ly related, 
ignoring current inflation, factors that causally affect inflation, in this case the fed funds 
rate, also affect stock prices.  When inflation is included in the test on, there
additional influence of the fed funds rate on stock prices.  On the other hand, inflation is 
found to cause stock prices when current inflation is added to the right hand side in the 
Granger cau ; infl s an initial and overall negative effect on 
                                                        
rise in the fed fund
he test for th hypothesis th
 there is a
, or raising st
ee years lat , but the ov effect of a  fed funds 
of inf is 
esult.  When c rent and past s of in e e add st equ e 
t effec
 year n low m in th r, 
es insignif cant after three y rs, once inf cou
causal
 equati  is no 
sality test equation ation ha
  
 Each lag remains significant, however, with the second lag having a coefficient of –0.379 (t = - 2.83) and 
the third lag having a coefficient of 0. 234 (t = 2.14).  As noted in Table 3, the sum is not different from 
zero once inflation is taken into account.      
18
 18 
 
 stock prices.  In the case of the transitory effect of the nominal fed funds rate on stock 
prices, the effect is positive, contrary to the expectations of proponents of a Fed reaction 
to stock price increases. 
 
Stock prices also cause the fed funds rate according to the causality tests.  The causality 
tests in the second and fourth rows of Table 3 show that a rise in stock prices (fall in the 
earnings-yield) will be followed two years later by a significant fall in the fed funds rate.  
or the real fed funds rate, the causality result is slightly different, with an initial rise in 
sts, 
 
 a Fed 
action to stock prices.  A higher fed funds rate raises stock prices, though this effect 
ck 
 
F
the fed funds rate a year later being followed by an offsetting fall in the real fed funds 
rate in the second year.  When the inflation rates are added to the Granger causality te
the results are more uniform and indicate that only the effect two years later is 
statistically significant and that higher stock prices lead to lower real and nominal fed
funds rate two years later.  This is strongly at odds with the direction of causality 
advocated by proponents of a Fed reaction.  Thus, the evidence on existing relationships 
contradicts both of the conventional hypotheses advocated by the proponents of
re
arises completely from the effects of the funds rate on inflation.  In turn, a higher sto
price leads to a fall in the fed funds rate and this effect is significant, whether or not 
inflation is included in the test equation.19  Thus the causal link tying a rise in stock 
prices to a subsequent fall in the real fed funds rate arises from a future fall in inflation.   
                                                          
19 This effect can also be shown to arise from inflation.  When two significant leading values of inflation 
are included in the estimate of the fed funds rate, along with the lagged fed funds rate and the second lag of 
the earnings-yield, the coefficient on the earnings yield is still positive (0.168), but it is not statistically 
significant (t = 1.37). 
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 IV.  Time Series Evidence 
The correlation results provide an overview of the issues and the causality tests suggest a 
link from movements in stock prices to the real fed funds rate, but it is possible to test the 
lationship of the federal funds rate and equity prices more fully using time series 
 
 
his level 
 
 
ing a 
                                                          
re
analysis.  First, it is necessary to identify the time series behavior of each series.  All four
measures in Table 1 have a unit root according to augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (ADF). 
The ADF statistics for the federal funds rate, earnings yield, real federal funds rate and 
inflation rate (number of included significant lagged dependent variables is given in 
parenthesis) are: -2.79 (1), -1.53 (0), -2.49 (0) and –1.90 (2), respectively.  The critical 
value (5 percent) is -2.94.  The unit root hypothesis for the federal funds rate is not 
rejected at a 10 percent significance level where the critical value is -2.61, but t
of significance is typically considered too weak. 
 
A unit root is rejected for all the first-differences of the series.  The ADF statistics are 
(lagged changes in parentheses): -5.94 (1), -6.56 (0), -6.57 (0) and -6.45 (1), for the 
federal funds rate, earnings yield, real federal funds rate and inflation, respectively; the
critical value (5%) equals -2.94.  Thus all four series are random walks and the measures
are potentially cointegrated.  Cointegration could provide very strong evidence favor
causal link between the real federal funds rate and stock prices. 20  
 
20 Persistence could account for the failure to reject a unit root.  Inclusion of a significant moving-average 
error process in the estimations indicates strong persistence.  For each of the four variables here, adding an 
MA (1) term is significant; the t-statistics are larger than 3.70 and the t-statistic on the relevant lagged level 
for the ADF test is also relatively large, suggesting that the variables are stationary.  In Tatom (2002), 
. 
monthly data for 1954 to 2001 finds that only the real fed funds rate is stationary.  If in fact the data here 
are I(0) then the long-run relationships, and their interpretation as such,  are not affected, but the parameter 
estimates would not have the super-consistency property that parameters in long-run relationships between 
I(1) series would have
 20 
 
 Johansen's method was used to examine whether bivariate pairs of the earnings yield, 
ta 
n for the optimal lag structure found 
om Likelihood Ratio tests.  The optimal lags were found assuming one potential 
 and 
 
funds rate. 
nominal federal funds rate, real federal funds rate and inflation are cointegrated.  The 
Schwartz criterion indicates in each case that for five alternative specifications of trends 
in the data and intercepts in the potential cointegrating equations (CE), the best 
specification is that without an intercept and trend.  The various specifications are: no 
data trend, with or without an intercept in the CEs, a linear trend in the data with an 
intercept in the CE and with or without a trend in the CE, and a quadratic trend in the da
with both an intercept and a trend in the CE.  The best specification—no trend or 
intercept in the CE—obtains for the model with specifications of the lagged differences 
in the variables ranging from one to four lags.   
 
Table 4 shows trace test statistics for cointegratio
fr
cointegrating equation.  No specification outperformed a “no-trend, no-intercept” 
specification.  Only two pairs of variables exhibit a significant CE, the earnings yield
the real federal funds rate and the earnings yield and inflation.  The trace test statistic for
two CE in these two-equation models are 0.64 and 0.58, respectfully, indicating that there 
is only one CE in each case (critical value is 3.84).  The nominal fed funds rate is 
unrelated to any measure in the long run, including the real federal 
 21 
 
 Table 4 
Cointegration tests  
Variables Lag Length Trace Statistic* 
E_P and FF 2 9.83 
E_P and RFF 3 22.40* 
E_P and PDOT 1 16.44* 
FF and RFF  2 6.10 
FF and PDOT 2 6.10 
RFF and PDOT 2 6.10 
*Critical Value: 12.52 (5%), 16.31 (1%) 
 the top panel for each model.  The first 
E indicates a long-run CE with a positive relation between the real yield and the real fed 
he 
5.  
onship 
 
The significant vector error correction (VEC) models are indicated in Table 5. 21 The 
significant cointegrating vectors are indicated in
C
funds rate.  For a long-run equilibrium value of the real fed funds rate of two percent, t
long-run equilibrium earnings yield is about eight or the equilibrium PE-ratio is 12.
The long-run relation provides strong support for the existence of the market relati
in which a rise in stock prices reduces the real fed funds rate, and conversely a rise in the 
fed funds rate lowers the earnings yield. 
                                                          
21 To check the robustness of the results for the earnings yield, tests of whether the log of the S&P price 
index is cointegrated with the nominal or real fed funds rate were conducted.  The tests indicate that, 
cointegration.  The optimal specifications have an intercept and no trend in the CE.  However, 
for 
both variables, the optimal VEC specification has one lag and the trace test indicates significant 
the t-statistic 
for the CE coefficient on either fed funds rate measure is not statistically significant (1.43 and 1.81, 
respectively).  In addition, the impulse response functions show that a positive shock to the fed funds rate 
has no effect on the stock price until two years later, then a negative effect for years two and three and 
subsequently the effect turns increasingly positive.  A positive shock to the real fed funds rate also has no 
effect on the stock price until year three, when it begins to be increasingly positive as well.  This is the 
same result as shown in the top panel of Figure 2 for the earnings yield below, where the positive stock 
price (negative earnings yield) effect appears in year three and beyond.  The stock price measure is poorly 
conditioned and should be measured in real terms or relative to earnings to control for the strong positive 
trend, though unit root tests reject a trend and a trend is not indicated in the specification tests for the CE.  
Nonetheless, the results support those in the test and the use of the earnings yield as an inverse measure of 
the stock price.   
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The second CE in Table 5 indicates that there is a long-run negative relation between 
inflation and stock prices, as indicated in the correlation analysis and as hypothesized.  
Together with the first CE, there is an ied third long-run relation between the real fed 
funds rate and inflation.  Specifically, each percentage point of inflation is associated 
with a 38 basis point rise in the real f ed 
neutrality of real rates with respect to inflation and with the marginally significant 
egative contemporaneous correlation for first-differences of the two measures (Table 2).  
f 
 the earnings yield (fall in stock price) will 
cause a rise in the earnings yield (momentum) and in the real fed funds rate.   
 impl
ed funds rate. This is at odds with the assum
n
Presumably it reflects a positive effect of inflation on the real fed funds rate because o
heightened policy risk or inflation uncertainty.22 The error correction (EC) term is 
indicated as the first term in the lower panel for each equation.  Each EC equation 
includes lags of the dependent variables to capture the dynamics in the relationship.  The 
standard error is indicated below each coefficient and the t-statistic is shown below the 
standard error. Statistically significant EC terms indicate significant causality. 23  The 
significance of the EC term from the first CE in the earnings yield and real fed funds rate 
equations indicate that a positive shock to
                                                          
22 This positive relationship is consistent with a significant positive relationship of the annual real 
eurocurrency yield and inflation in a cross section of 17 advanced economies over the 1973-99 period.  
Tatom (2000) finds that each percentage point rise in inflation raises the real rate by 25 basis points, not 
much different from the 38 basis points implied in Table 5.  Sharpe (2002) also finds that inflation raises a 
measure of the expected real bond yield and by even more than here (0.75). 
23 This causal interpretation of a significant error correction term in a VEC model follows Engel and 
ranger (1987).  G
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 Table 5 
ion  
Standard errors & t-statistics in parentheses    
Error Correction Models for the Earnings Yield, Real Fed Funds Rate and Inflat
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1  Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq2  
E_P(-1)  1.00  E_P(-1)  1.00  
      
RFF(-1) -3.893  PDOT(-1) -1.506  
 (-7.70)   (-13.12)  
Error Correction: D(E_P) D(RFF) Error Correction: D(E_P) D(PDOT) 
  (0.5054)    (0.1148)  
CointEq1  0.104  0.133 CointEq2  0.016  0.295 
  (0.0403)  (0.0400)   (0.0927)  (0.0983) 
      
D(E_P(-1)) -0.269 -0.605 D(E_P(-1)) -0.150 -0.023 
 (-1.50) (-3.39)  (-0.70) (-0.10) 
      
  (0.1952)  (0.1931)    
 (-1.98) (-0.47)    
D(E_P(-3)) -0.484 -0.289    
  (0.1854)  (0.1841)    
      
D(RFF(-1))  0.390  0.258 D(PDOT(-1))  0.115  0.448 
  (2.28)  (1.52)   (0.63)  (2.31) 
      
  (0.1602)  (0.1591)    
 (-1.28)  (0.20)    
D(RFF(-3))  0.079  0.090    
  (0.1604)  (0.1592)    
 Adj. R-squared  0.203  0.294  Adj. R-squared -0.040  0.228 
  (2.59)  (3.32)   (0.17)  (3.00) 
  (0.1797)  (0.1784)   (0.2149)  (0.2277) 
D(E_P(-2)) -0.387 -0.092    
      
 (-2.61) (-1.57)    
  (0.171)  (0.1699)   (0.1828)  (0.1938) 
D(RFF(-2)) -0.205  0.032    
      
  (0.49)  (0.57)    
 Sum sq. resids  53.87953  53.09624  Sum sq. resids  82.7089  92.9919 
 F-statistic  2.57  3.57  F-statistic  0.24  6.75 
 Log likelihood -60.5538 -60.2755  Log likelihood -71.2865 -73.6302 
 Schwarz SC  3.8571  3.8425  Schwarz SC  3.8410  3.
 Mean dependent -0.0574  0.031  Mean dependent -0.0565  0.
 S.E. equation  1.3184  1.3087  S.E. equation  1.4951  1.5853 
 Akaike AIC  3.5555  3.5408  Akaike AIC  3.7143  3.8315 
9581 
0413 
 S.D. dependent  1.4771  1.5579  S.D. dependent  1.4659  1.8039 
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 This significant EC term also indicates that a positive shock to the real fed funds rate will 
sig orr r the real ed fund ifi  the E  term 
from the second CE in the inflation equation indic  a posit ck to the 
earnings yield or fall in inflation will cause a rise in the earnings yield and a fall in 
inflat error correction for inflation and a strong negative effect of 
stock prices on inflation. In particular, a positive shock to the earnings yield (a decline in 
stock prices) causes a rise in inflation. 
 
It is im  to note sality eans a systematic time sequencing of 
deve   Thus, idence i iste t w es in lly e d 
inflation lowering stock prices before the inflation increase is observed.  The result is also 
consistent with the notion that a rise in stock prices, which lowers the earnings yield and 
cost of capital, can permanently lower prices.  Both the real federal funds rate and 
bit error correction properties, but the earnings yield does not.  The earnings 
ect to inflation and exhibits momen a 
n to its ast sho
e series evidence on causal relationships between the real fed funds rate and the 
earnings yield (stock prices) reinforces the causality results in rejecting the conventional 
view.  Table 6 provides a summary of these differences.  The time series evidence shows 
a dominant long-run market response, but it is capable of reconciling the correlation and 
simple causality results as well.   
 
lower the earnings yield and reduce the real fed funds rate.  The latter effect indicates 
nificant error c ection fo  f s rate. The sign cance of C
ates that ive sho
ion.  There is significant  
po tantr  that cau  only m
lopments. the ev s cons n ith increas rationa xpecte
inflation exhi
yield (stock price) is exogenous with resp tum (
positive relatio  own p cks).  
 
The tim
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 Table 6 
 From RFF to E_P From E_P to RFF 
Relationship of the Real Fed Funds Rate (RFF) and the Earnings Yield (E_P) 
Conventional Hypothesis  +  
(Market Response) 
- 
(Proposed Fed Response) 
Correlation Result 0 0 
Causality Result - (-*)** +* (+)** 
Time Series Evidence:   
Long-Run (CE)  + + 
Error Correction Response - + 
*Positive sum effect after two years is not significantly different from zero.  
**Including current and lagged inflation terms in Granger-causality test equation 
 
The time series results find a long-run equilibrium positive relationship between the 
earnings yield and real fed funds rate, consistent with the expectation of a positive link 
between real yields across the maturity spectrum and with the expected market resp
However, the error correction terms in the VEC model show a bi-directional pattern that 
is precisely the opposite of that expected in the conventional view and identical to tha
found in the causality tests.  The EC effec
onse.  
t 
t indicates that a rise in the real fed funds rate 
ces in Table 6 is possible using the impulse-
sponse function results below.   
will raise stock prices and a rise in stock prices will lower the fed funds rate.  Both 
reactions presumably arise because of the link between stock prices and inflation.  When 
stock prices rise, inflation improves and the Fed apparently eases, while increases in the 
fed funds rate suggest lower subsequent inflation, inducing a subsequent rise in stock 
prices.  Some clarification of the differen
re
 26 
 
 Implications of the Time Series Model for Shocks 
he 
real federal funds rate, the earnings yield and inflation on the three variables.  Figure 2 
provides impulse-response patterns of the effects of shocks to each variable on the other 
measures.  In the top left panel, the principal result is that a one-standard deviation rise in 
the real federal funds rate has no effect on the earnings yield for two years and a negative 
effect in year three and beyond.  Over time, such a shock will lower the earnings yield by 
about 70 basis points.  This is precisely the opposite of the effect expected by most 
cate using the federal fun et!   
us correlation for 
funds rate.  The bottom panel on the left shows that there is 
 
impulse response panel on top right of Figure 2, 
The VEC model can be used to illustrate some of the dynamic effects of shocks to t
analysts who advo ds rate to stabilize the equity mark
 
However, the initial pattern supports the absence of a contemporaneo
stock prices and the real fed 
also a negative dynamic relation between the real funds rate and the earnings yield that 
indicates that a fall in stock prices can induce a fall in the real funds rate 
contemporaneously and one year later.  This is the same as the dynamic effect expected 
by proponents of a Fed reaction and it is the same as the effect observed after one year in 
the simple causality results above (Table 3).  There the effect is not statistically 
significant when inflation is taken into account, however; the only significant effect is a 
positive one that occurs with a two-year lag.   
 
The error-correction term for the effect of a rise in the earnings yield on the real fed funds
rate in the second column on the left in Table 4 also shows the positive causal link from a 
positive shock to the earnings yield to the real fed funds rate.  Note that inflation has little 
or no effect on the real funds rate in the 
 27 
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s a large positive effect on inflation. 
This response is also indicated in the long-run equilibrium relationship.  
 
Impulse-Response Patterns for Shocks to the Error-Correction Model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
derlying 
l 
ing the negative relation between stock 
rices and the real fed funds rate that is referred to here as the market response.  
but a fall in stock price (rise in the earnings yield) ha
Figure 2 
(Based on Table 5) 
  
 
 
 
Response o f E_P to O ne S .D . InnovationsResponse of E_P to One S.D. Innovations
1.6
0.5
1.0
1.5
 
 
 
 
 
 
These results support the positive long-run relationship between the real fed funds rate 
and the earnings yield, which shows the long-run character of the relationship un
the market response.  This relationship indicates that an increase in the earnings yield wil
permanently raise the real fed funds rate, induc
p
However, the direction of causality is the opposite of the conventional view.  Second, a 
positive shock to the real fed funds rate will rotate the long-term relation between yields, 
raising stock prices. This effect occurs with a three-year delay, however.  The same sign 
of the effect is indicated by the EC term for the first equation in the left panel of Table 5 
-1.0
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e leading 
lation from increases in the real fed funds rate to higher stock prices occurs because of 
 delayed 
sponse of inflation to changes in the real fed funds rate.   
imilar cointegration tests were conducted for the three variables: inflation, the real fed 
nds rate and the earnings yield.  A search of the lag length for the dynamics of included 
gged first-difference in the variables indicates that one lag is optimal.  The criterion for 
is choice is a Likelihood Ratio test conducted assuming one or two cointegrating 
quations.24  With one lag, the cointegration test indicates the presence of two CEs.  The 
ikelihood Ratio statistic for no CE, at most one CE and at most two CE are (critical 
alues in parenthesis) 35.55 (1%: 29.75), 17.76 (1%: 16.31), and 1.30 (5%: 3.84), 
spectively.  The first two statistics are above both the five-percent and one-percent 
critical values, while the latter is not above either.  Thus the tests indicate the presence of 
two significant CEs.   
 
 
      (-13.20) 
RFF - 0.385 PDOT = 0 
 
and in the Granger causality result in Table 3.  There this effect becomes insignificant 
when inflation is included in the estimation.  This again points out that th
re
the long-run negative relationship between inflation and stock prices and the
re
 
S
fu
la
th
e
L
v
re
The normalized cointegration equations are: 
(1) E_P – 1.529 PDOT = 0 
 
        (-3.62) 
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  The CE equations indicate significant long-
run positive relationships between both the earnings yield and real fed funds rate and the 
                                                          
24 The Chi-squared statistics for two and three lags are 12.330 and 8.901 for the model with two CEs and 
15.145 and 9.299 for one CE, respectively.  The critical value is 16.919.  
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 earnings yield and inflation.  These imply that the earnings yield in the long run is agai
about four (3.976) times the real fed funds rate (t = 4.45).  Thus these results also su
a long run link from the longest to shortest real yields.  These CE results also are nearly 
identical to those presented above for bivariate relations.  The key difference between 
VEC model for these CEs and those for the bivariate case is
n 
pport 
the 
 that, in the three variable 
stem, there is a potential response of inflation to the real fed funds rate.  This response 
 
ove 
real fed funds rate—is a long-run equilibrium relationship.  
econd, the error correction term, impulse-response function and earlier simple causality 
vidence show that this relationship arises in a dynamic context from shocks to stock 
prices c posite change in the real fed funds rate.  Positive shocks to the real 
fed funds rate, with a lag (see Tables1-3) induce increases in stock prices two years later 
ccording the first error-correction term in left panel of Table 5, the impulse-response 
sy
is not significant according to the error correction coefficient.25  The long-run positive 
relation between inflation and the real fed funds rate shown in equation 1 is implicit in 
the two cointegrating relationships shown at the top of Table 5.  Adding the insignificant 
dynamics of the relationships in the three-variable system does not alter the impulse
response relationships shown in Figure 2.  
 
The time series results in this section are much stronger than the causality results ab
and provide considerable insight into those results and the underlying economic 
relationships.  First, they show that the market response—a positive relationship of the 
earnings yield and the 
S
e
ausing the op
a
                                                          
25 The coefficient on the error correction term for the second cointegrating relationship in Equation 1 above 
is –0.234, but it is not statistically significant (t = - 1.61).  In the impulse-response experiment, a one-
t standard deviation shock to the real federal funds rate ( 2.015 percentage points) reduces inflation by abou
0.5 percentage points initially and after about five years.   
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 graph (top left) in Figure 2, function, and the simple causality result (Table 3).  
According to the latter evidence, the significant positive effect of the real fed funds rate 
on stock prices occurs only due to inflation, which is reduced by an earlier increase in the
real fed funds rate.  Thus, increases in stock prices can be indicators of past success in 
attempting to control inflation, or of other forces reducing inflation.  They are not sour
or indicators of higher inflation currently or in the future.   
 
Despite the absence of an exploitable link between stock prices and policy, it is possible
that equity prices already have had a systematic effect on policy-makers’ efforts to set the 
fed funds rate in the past.  To examine this, the Taylor Rule [see Taylor (1993) and 
1999)] linking inflation and the GDP gap is
 
ces 
V.  Does the Fed Already Take Equity Prices into Account?  
  
 estimated and current and lagged values of 
e earnings yield are added to test the hypothesis that the fed funds rate already responds 
 dummy 
al 
 
 
. 
th
to stock prices.  The federal funds rate was unusually high in 1981 and this could affect 
the statistical results.  For that reason, this unusual level is controlled for with the
variable D81, which is one in 1981 and zero otherwise.26  The GDP gap measure is the 
percentage excess of real GDP over potential GDP as estimated by the Congression
Budget Office.   
 
The statistically significant information from the earnings yield for the federal funds rate
is found to include a temporary contemporaneous effect that disappears one year later but
is permanent after two years.  The temporary and permanent effects are nearly the same
                                                          
26 The use of D81 in the estimations here and below does not affect any of the conclusions. There is no
structural shift in the estimates when this variable is included, but there is one when it is omitted, according 
to Chow tests.  
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 The estimate includes a significant first order autoregressive term whose coeffic
0.683 (t = 4.48).  
 
(2) FF =  -0.431  + 0.522 FF (-1)  + 0.408 PDOT  + 0.457 GAP  + 0.309 D(E_P) 
 
   (2.39)        (3.01) 
ient is 
 
         (-0.37)  (3.85)     (3.53)      (3.61)     (3.17) 
 + 0.254 E_P(-2)  + 2.460 D81 
 
djusted R2 = 0.91   S.E. = 0.910  D.W. = 1.76 
The sign of the relationship is again the opposite of that advocated by proponents of a 
central bank response to stock prices.  The dynamics show that, given the inflation rate 
and GDP gap, a rise in stock prices (fall in the earnings yield) will induce a cut in federal 
funds rate within the year.  This effect is consistent with the simple causality evidence 
and the impulse-response results observed in the time series results above (bottom panel 
on left in Figure 2).   It is also consistent with the long-run relation between the real fed 
funds rate and stock prices and with the error correction result in Table 6.    The 1981 
variable has no effect on the estimates, but without it, the stability of the coefficients in 
recursive estimates varies considerably and when it is included, the coefficients show 
little change. 
 
A
 
27
28
                                                          
 One might suspect that the sign of the stock price relationship reflects reverse causality.  The evidence in
Table 3 indicates that causality runs from the earnings yield to the fed funds rate with this positive relation 
27  
and rejects the reverse direction of causality when inflation is included as it is here.   
28 Including stock prices has a material effect on the response of the fed funds rate to a rise in inflation.  
The equilibrium effect of a rise in inflation on the federal funds rate in equation 2, imposing the long-run 
relation between inflation and the earnings yield on the right hand side of Table 5, is a 170 basis point rise 
e stock price terms or D81 it is 144 basis points.   
per percentage point rise in inflation.  This is not much different from the Taylor Rule response of 150 
basis points.  When equation 2 is estimated without stock price terms, the response falls to 111 basis points.  
Without either th
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 It is likely that the Fed reaction reducing the fed funds rate when stock prices rise simply 
reflects the role of a third factor instead of a direct Fed reaction.  For example, the Fed 
ften appears to follow market interest rates in setting the federal funds rate.  Since 
 
prices do, but inversely, increases in inflationary expectations can give a higher fed funds 
rate and to redu
This “wrong” sign is also observed when stock price measures are used directly in the  
reaction function instead of the earnings yield.  First, when the log of the price earnings 
ratio (LPE) is used, the negative effect appears immediately and longer lags or dynamics 
are not significant (the AR coefficient is 0.740, t = 5.51): 
 
81 
         (1.61)    (3.39)           (3.51)            (3.00)       (-3.07)          (3.57) 
Adjusted R  = 0.90  S.E. = 0.902   D.W. = 1.86 
 
ted 
f the S&P stock price.  The contemporaneous term has a negative, but 
significant effect (t=-0.22), but the first-difference is significant, as are both 
components.  The constraint that the effects are equal and offsetting cannot be rejected 
o
market interest rates positively reflect information about future inflation, just as stock
 ctions in stock prices.  
 
(3) FF = 1.549 + 0.487 FF(-1) + 0.420 PDOT + 0.382 GAP -2.435 D(LPE) + 2.890 D
 
2
 
Each ten percentage point rise in stock prices relative to earnings reduces the fed funds 
rate by about 24 basis points, according to the estimate.29  The same tests were conduc
using the log o
in
(t=0.24).  Again a rise in stock prices is associated with a decline in the fed funds rate  
                                                          
29 When the level of the log of the PE ratio two years earlier is added to equation 3, comparable to the 
structure of equation 2, its coefficient, -1.612, is marginally insignificant (t = -2.00) and the 
contemporaneous first-difference is about the same (-2.680, t =-3.33). 
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 and the effect is about the same as that in equation 2, though it is temporary.30  The AR 
coefficient is 0.806 and its t-statistic is 7.20. 
 
         (1.99)    (2.34)           (3.96)           (3.08)      (-2.25)          (3.31)
Adjusted R2 = 0.89  S.E. = 1.024   D.W. = 1.81 
(4) FF = 2.460 + 0.342 FF(-1) + 0.483 PDOT + 0.418 GAP -2.736 D(LSP) + 2.767 D81 
 
 
 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) also find a negative stock price effect on the federal funds 
rate in a Taylor Rule estimate with quarterly data, though in their case the effect is 
insignificant.   
 
Rigoban and Sack (2001) conclude that a 5 percent rise in the S&P 500 price index raises 
the three-month T-bill rate by 10.7 basis points.  They argue that this is consistent with a 
                   
31
Fed reaction.  But their analysis of the Fed reaction traces the effect of a stock price rise  
                                       
30 When lags of the log of the S&P stock price index replace the earnings yield in equation 2, two 
gnificant lags of the level of the stock price measure (one year and two year lags) are significant and have 
3.21). In this case, a lagged value of the stock price change has a significant positive effect on the federal 
3 except that the initial negative effect of the stock price change is not significant (t = 0.01).  The long 
 the 
icate if any 
egative 
coefficient for stock prices and it is significant.  They interpret the effect as a Greenspan-Fed effect, feeding 
(t 
s 
insignificant lags ranging from one to five months, but the contemporaneous term remains significant and 
negative in each case.  It is likely that their insignificant negative result for the U.S. arises from the 
inclusion of several insignificant lagged effects of stock prices in the reported sum, just as would occur 
here.  The interpretation of the negative coefficient on stock prices in Tatom (2002), as here, is not that it 
represents a policy effort to feed bubbles, but rather reflects the future favorable inflation news in increased 
om 
si
equal and opposite effects on the fed funds rate.  The coefficient on the lagged change in the log of the 
stock price indicates that a one percent rise in stock prices raises the fed funds rate by 4.29 basis points (t = 
funds rate, contrary to the dynamics observed in equations 4.  The result is similar to that in equations 2 and 
delay and other evidence above of a quicker response makes this temporary effect likely spurious.   
31 The negative and insignificant discussed by Bernanke and Gertler (BG) is for the sum of effects over
current and five past months.  They do not report the contemporaneous or lagged effect, nor ind
individual coefficients are significant and negative.  Hayford and Malliaris (2001) also find a n
the creation of a stock price bubble.  Ending the estimation of equation 3 above in 1995 results in a 
coefficient on the stock price term that is slightly smaller in absolute value (-2.675) , but still significant 
= -2.08).  In Tatom (2002), the same negative and significant effect of stock prices on the fed funds rate i
observed using monthly data.  There an insignificant sum, as in BG, is obtained for additions of 
current stock prices. BG also find a negative and significant stock price effect in Japan for the period fr
1979 through 1986:06, though this effect reverses in the 1990s. 
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 on consumption spending and GDP and, via the latter, to a Fed reaction to an increase in
the GDP gap, where the gap coefficient is aro
 
und one.  In this case, they argue, the Fed 
action would be 15 to 30 basis points.  But this analysis does not suggest an 
 doe o 
s ck pri  chan  such a 
framework.  In fact, there is no significant correlation between the percentage change in 
the stock price and the change in the GDP gap at an annual frequency (r= 0.28, critical 
value = 0.31).  The correlation coefficient for changes in the price-earnings ratio and in 
the gap is negative and also insignificant (-0.19). 
 
Thus, it appears that the Rigoban and Sack evidence is consistent with the absence of past 
Fed reactions to stock price changes beyond any that might arise through a stock price 
effect on inflation or the GDP gap.  If one alters their assumed reactions of inflation and 
the gap to stock prices, however, the implied Fed response to a change in stock prices 
re
independent reaction within a Taylor Rule context.  Their analysis also s not take int
account the changing size of the effect of a to ce ge on GDP in
would also be reversed.  For example, suppose that the gap is unrelated to stock prices 
that inflation and stock prices are significantly inversely related.  Then if the Fed 
responds to stock prices following the Rigoban and Sack argument, it would reduce 
interest rates when stock prices rise.  
 
Even if the Fed could control equity prices in the long run, it would not be advisable.32   
                                                          
32 Cecchetti et al. (2000) follow Smets (1997a, 1997b) in claiming a theoretical basis for a Fed reaction to 
stock prices.  They examine three possible supply shocks to the asset and goods markets in Smets model.  
In only one of these will a Fed reaction to stock prices stabilize inflation.  This shock is a permanent asset 
market shock that is unaccompanied by a goods market shock.  An asset market shock that does not affect 
the goods market, and in a manner that offsets any inflation effect, is not easily imagined.  In other cases, a 
ed reaction would not stabilize inflation.   F
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 Such an effort requires that the central bank know the appropriate measure or target.  
Second, such efforts presume that there is a politically acceptable mandate and 
justification for taking policy actions explicitly aimed at damaging the econom
of some parties.  It is difficult enough (technically, economically and politically) to 
conduct policy while minimizing such unintended consequences of policy.  Is the
principle that allows a policy maker to intentionally inflict damage on stockholders  
without judicial review or compensation? 
 
More important, the time series evidence above in
ic interest 
re a 
dicates that a fall in stock prices (rise in 
e earnings yield) reflects a subsequent rise in inflation.  Should the Fed tighten in the 
e 
 Fed 
ts all wrong.  If the Fed wants to influence stock 
rices in a way that furthers an inflation objective, then it would raise the fed funds rate 
at least, that is what the Fed has been doing in the past when claiming to fight inflation or 
th
face of higher inflation or ease in the face of the decline in stock prices associated with 
higher inflation?  In the case of a rise in stock prices and beneficial effect on inflation, 
Fed tightening would seem unnecessary or inappropriate.  Similarly when stock prices 
fall, worsening inflation, a focus on inflation would suggest that the Fed should not eas
in response to the decline in stock prices. 
 
The reaction function results provide one more body of evidence that proponents of a
reaction have got the direction of effec
p
when stock prices are “low” and reduce it when stock prices are “high.”  But implicitly, 
maintain price stability.  Inflation control maximizes stock prices.  If the Fed could 
independently pursue a low fed funds, rate then stock prices could be boosted further 
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 according to the cointegration results here.  An attempt to raise stock prices by lowerin
the fed funds rate, however, would run up against the fact that the preponderanc
evidence (causality, error-correction and impulse–response function) shows that such an 
effort would lower stock prices (again because the inflation outlook would worsen). 
any event, the time series and causality evidence concur that the Fed cannot control the 
real fed funds rate in the long run.  The Fed can only influence the real fed funds rate
g 
e of 
 In 
 in 
 inflation rates (Table 3).33   
The link between equity prices and monetary policy has become the subject of a rapidly 
growing literature due, in part, to the stellar performance of the U.S. equity market (1996-
2000) and subsequent bear market, coupled with the increased exposure of households to 
equity wealth and risk.  Some policy analysts suggest that the Fed should target the equity 
price or at least take it into account in its efforts to stabilize inflation, prices or other 
objectives.  This article provides evidence on many of the issues raised by proposals that 
the Fed could or should attempt to influence stock prices.  It shows that reacting to stock 
prices is unnecessary and likely to be stabilizing.  Reacting in the direction currently 
advocated by many would actually be perverse.  First, there is no contemporaneous 
correlation between the real fed funds rate and the real yield on stocks implicit in the PE 
ratio, either in levels or first-differences from 1959-2000.  A strong negative correlation 
between the federal funds rate and the PE ratio arises from the significant correlation  
the short run, that is given current and past
 
VI.  Summary 
                                                          
33 In Tatom (2002) the real fed funds rate is found to be stationary in monthly data from 1954 to 2001.  
annual evidence should reveal long-run relationships less noisily, but the degrees of freedom in annual 
The 
data 
may technically be too small to allow rejection of a unit root.  The implication of a stationary unit root is 
that policy cannot alter it in the long run.   
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 of each to inflation.  This relationship is negative for the PE ratio and positive for the 
federal funds rate.  Inflation also affects the relationship between stock prices and the
funds rate found in simple causality tests, in times series evidence and in Fed reaction 
functions.   
 
Simple causality tests favor a bi-directional relationship between the earnings yield and 
the nominal or real fed funds rate, but in each direction the relationship 
 fed 
is exactly the 
pposite of that suggested by advocates of a stock price reaction.  A rise in the fed funds 
 stock prices and a rise in stock prices leads to a lower real fed funds rate 
after two years, though the latter effect is only significant if inflation is held constant by 
including it in the test equation.  Controlling for inflation, the simple causality test 
equations show that the Fed cannot influence stock prices.  The time series evidence 
supports the absence of a contemporaneous correlation, showing that a positive shock to 
the real fed funds rate has no initial effect on the stock price.  
 
There is evidence of a strong positive long-run relationship between the earnings yield 
and the real federal funds rate and that the latter has error-correcting properties.  The 
significant long-run positive relationship indicates that, in the long run, stock prices are 
inversely related to the real fed funds rate, as the market response and a long-run positive 
relation between yields of various maturities would suggest.  This long-run relation 
indicates that the equilibrium earnings yield is about four times the real federal funds 
rate.  For an equilibrium real federal funds rate of about 2 percent, which some have 
o
rate raises future
suggested, the long-run earnings yield is about eight and equilibrium price-earnings ratio 
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 is about 12.5, far below levels seen since 1995.  A second long-run equilibrium relatio
indicates that the earnings yield is positively related to inflation, supporting the 
hypothesis that stock prices are adversely affected by inflation.  Together with the first 
long-run rela
n 
tion, there is an implied positive long-run relation between the real fed funds 
te and inflation.   
 
e an 
cy.  
 or instead should have 
sed stock price appreciations for timely “opportunistic disinflation,” is a strategy issue 
 
an 
ed 
ra
 
Overall, the evidence here rejects any ability of the Fed to influence stock prices in the
long run by their setting of the fed funds rate.  It also shows that Fed efforts to influence 
stock prices in the medium term would have the opposite effects to those proposed by 
advocates of a Fed reaction to stock prices.  In the short run, within the year, there is no 
correlation between stock prices and the real fed funds rate.  At best, stock prices ar
indicator of inverse movements in inflation, not an appropriate or useful target of poli
A variant of the Taylor Rule relation suggests that the Fed has taken such indicator 
properties into account in the past.  Whether they should have,
u
that goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
What about stock market bubbles?  Even if they do not have adverse effects on inflation,
they presumably affect (“distort”) investment choices and the allocation of resources.  
Can monetary policy be used to address them?  The time series evidence shows that 
artificially low earnings yield, held down by a bubble, could be raised by a permanent 
shock to the real fed funds rate, but the required shock would be a decline in the real f
funds rate, fostering inflation.  The response of the bubble would come only with a fairly 
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 long lag.  Moreover, the Fed cannot permanently lower the real fed funds rate according 
to the evidence here.  At least in the short to medium term, the evidence here pro
useful actions that could address bubbles.  Longer term, actions to promote inflation 
could lower stock prices, but adjusted for the higher inflation, stock prices might still 
appear excessive.   
vides no 
 
t 
d inflation and implicitly in boosting 
vestment and real GDP in 1996-2000.   
 
There is a final implication of the empirical results here that bears on the recent popular
and policy discussions of the role of stock prices in affecting overall economic 
performance.  Most of this discussion has focused on the potential wealth effect on 
consumer spending.  The permanent income hypothesis and the structure of the nation's 
wealth both suggest that undue attention has been paid to equity capital.  Moreover there 
is no evidence that consumption grew unusually large relative to GDP in the 1990s or has 
fallen since mid 2000 as a result of stock price movements.  Another channel of 
influence—the effect of stock prices in affecting the cost of capital—has been largely 
ignored.  The results here suggest that stock price developments have played a significan
role in holding down the cost of capital an
in
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